So, is this how Goldman Sachs does it?
"It," of course, is making gobs of money even when nobody else on Wall Street can.
And those profits then go into outrageous bonuses to employees, which cause rancor on Capitol Hill and on Main Street.
You've heard the old saying, "It's not what you know, but who you know."
Goldman Sachs knows lots of important people. That fact is indisputable, mainly because former Goldman employees are scattered around the country, and the globe, in important, decision-making financial positions.
But I'd like to make an addendum to that old saying, which I'll explore for you today: Who you know is only important if you can get them on the phone anytime you want.
Today's column is about Thursday, Sept. 18, 2008.
It's also about the unparalleled access that Goldman Sachs had to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, whose mission -- according to his own words -- was to bring Wall Street and market regulators (not to mention decision makers) together, so that they were "seeing the same issues, the same problems and working toward the same solutions." On Wednesday, Sept. 17, 2008 -- the day before the one I am writing about -- the stock market performed horribly.
By the end of the session the Dow Jones industrial average tumbled 449 points as investors worried about the nation's financial system. The next morning, Sept. 18, Paulson placed his first call of the day at 6:55 a.m., to Lloyd Blankfein, who succeeded Paulson as CEO of Goldman. It's unclear whether the two connected because Blankfein called Paulson minutes later.
And then Blankfein placed another call to Paulson at 7:05 a.m. for what looks like a 10-minute conversation.
After that Paulson called Christopher Cox, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman twice; British Chancellor Alistair Darling and New York Federal Reserve head (and now Treasury Secretary) Tim Geithner two times.
Then Paulson took another call from Goldman's Blankfein.
It wasn't even 9 a.m. yet -- 30 minutes before the stock market was to open -- and Paulson and Blankfein had already exchanged three phone calls.
This wasn't particularly unusual.
On Wednesday, Sept. 17, the day the stock market was in trouble, Paulson spoke with Blankfein five times, including a pair of calls at 7:20 p.m. and 8:45 p.m. One of the earlier calls -- at 12:15 p.m. -- is listed on Paulson's log in the same five minute interval as a call to Geithner, which could indicate that this was a conference call.
If Paulson did set up a conference call, it would have been an extreme instance of putting someone who wielded a lot of power -- Geithner -- together with someone -- Blankfein -- who could profit from that connection.
And all of this doesn't include possible cell phone calls. The Treasury turned over to me Paulson's official schedule and phone records after I made a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
There's no way for me, or anyone else, to know what Blankfein and Paulson talked about during those first three calls on Sept. 18.
But it would be reasonable to assume that the conversation, coming as it did in a period of market turmoil, had something to do with what was happening on Wall Street.
So no matter how you slice, dice or excuse it, Blankfein by 9 a.m. would have had information that was not available to anyone else who makes their money trading securities. And, as you can imagine, there is a whole lot of value in that kind of inside access.
Robert Scully, a co-president of Morgan Stanley, called Paulson at 8:50 a.m. on the 18th.
But he appears to be the only Wall Street type who was in contact with Paulson until Larry Fink, head of the private investment firm Blackrock, called at 12:40 p.m.
By then the stock market was going down again. But the decline wouldn't last long.
By John Crudele
New York Post
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
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