The Second Leg of the Great Depression Was Caused by European Defaults

(George Washington Blog)- Many Americans know that the Great Depression was started by the bursting of the giant Wall Street bubble of the 1920's (fueled by the use of bank deposits on speculative gambling, which is why Glass-Steagall was passed) , which in turn caused a run on American banks.

But most Americans don't know that the second leg of the Depression was caused by European defaults.

As Yves Smith reminds us:

Recall that the Great Depression nadir was the sovereign debt default phase.

The second leg down of the Depression was larger than the first, as shown by this chart of the Dow:



The second leg down was primarily initiated by the failure of the Creditanstalt bank in Austria. Creditanstalt (also spelled Kreditanstalt) declared bankruptcy in May 1931.

As Time Magazine noted on November 2, 1931:

May 14 [1931]: First thunderclap of the present crisis: collapse in Vienna of Kreditanstalt, colossal Rothschild bank, which is taken over by the Austrian Government, shaking confidence in related German banks.

A book written by Aurel Schubert, published by Cambridge University Press, points out that:

Austria played a prominent role in the worldwide events of 1931 as the largest bank in Central and Eastern Europe, the Viennese Credit-Anstalt, collapsed and led Europe into a financial panic that spread to other parts of the world. The events in Austria were pivotal to the economic developments of the 1930s ....

As Megan McArdle points out:

The Great Depression was composed of two separate panics. As you can see from contemporary accounts ... in 1930 people thought they'd seen the worst of things.

Unfortunately, the economic conditions created by the first panic were now eating away at the foundations of financial institutions and governments, notably the failure of Creditanstalt in Austria. The Austrian government, mired in its own problems, couldn't forestall bankruptcy; though the bank was ultimately bought by a Norwegian bank, the contagion had already spread. To Germany. Which was one of the reasons that the Nazis came to power. It's also, ultimately, one of the reasons that we had our second banking crisis, which pushed America to the bottom of the Great Depression, and brought FDR to power here.

Not that I think we're going to get another Third Reich out of this, or even another Great Depression. But it means we should be wary of the infamous "double dip" that a lot of economists have been expecting.

Way to go, guys ... you're re-creating history.

Republicans Sound Alarm on Administration Plan to Seize 401(k)s

(Human Events) - In February, the White House released its “Annual Report on the Middle Class” containing new regulations favored by Big Labor including a bailout of critically underfunded union pension plans through “retirement security” options.

The radical solution most favored by Big Labor is the seizure of private 401(k) plans for government disbursement -- which lets them off the hook for their collapsing retirement scheme. And, of course, the Obama administration is eager to accommodate their buddies.

Vice President Joe Biden floated the idea, called “Guaranteed Retirement Accounts” (GRAs), in the February “Middle Class” report.

In conjunction with the report’s release, the Obama administration jointly issued through the Departments of Labor and Treasury a “Request for Information” regarding the “annuitization” of 401(k) plans through “Lifetime Income Options” in the form of a notice to the public of proposed issuance of rules and regulations. (pdf)

By: Connie Hair

Read Entire Article

Now We Know the Truth. The Financial Meltdown Wasn’t a Mistake — It Was a Con

By: Will Hutton
The Observer

The global financial crisis, it is now clear, was caused not just by the bankers’ colossal mismanagement. No, it was due also to the new financial complexity offering up the opportunity for widespread, systemic fraud. Friday’s announcement that the world’s most famous investment bank, Goldman Sachs, is to face civil charges for fraud brought by the American regulator is but the latest of a series of investigations that have been launched, arrests made and charges made against financial institutions around the world.

Big Finance in the 21st century turns out to have been Big Fraud. Yet Britain, centre of the world financial system, has not yet levelled charges against any bank; all that we’ve seen is the allegation of a high-level insider dealing ring which, embarrassingly, involves a banker advising the government. We have to live with the fiction that our banks and bankers are whiter than white, and any attempt to investigate them and their institutions will lead to a mass exodus to the mountains of Switzerland. The politicians of the Labour and Tory party alike are Bambis amid the wolves.

Just consider the roll call beyond Goldman Sachs. In Ireland Sean FitzPatrick, the ex-chair of the Anglo Irish bank was arrested last month and questioned over alleged fraud. In Iceland last week a dossier assembled by its parliament on the Icelandic banks – huge lenders in Britain – was handed to its public prosecution service. A court-appointed examiner found that collapsed investment bank Lehman knowingly manipulated its balance sheet to make it look stronger than it was – accounts originally audited by the British firm Ernst and Young and given the legal green light by the British firm Linklaters. In Switzerland UBS has been defending itself from the US’s Inland Revenue Service for allegedly running 17,000 offshore accounts to evade tax. Be sure there are more revelations to come – except in saintly Britain.

Read More

BOMBSHELL: Bank Of International Settlements Sees US Debt/GDP At Over 400% By 2040

Tyler Durden
ZeroHedge

It's one thing to hear fringe bloggers raving breathlessly against the collision course that the US economy is on. It is something else to see the Bank of International Settlements call for the baseline projection for US debt/GDP to hit over 400% by 2040. And this excludes the bankrupt GSEs, bankrupt Social Security, and the soon to be bankrupt Medicare. In a must read report, the BIS (of the central bankers' central bank) provides the much needed segue to the work of Reinhart and Rogoff, and in not so many words confirms that the entire developed world is now bankrupt on a discounted basis.

With Debt/GDP ratios for virtually everyone expected to jump to over 400% in the bank's baseline scenario, it is no surprise why the Dow may well hit 1 quadrillion on nothing but Weimar and Zimbabwean ponzification, before it crashes instantaneously to zero. We exaggerate about the quadrillion, we do not exaggerate about the sovereign default. The current and previous administrations have doomed this country, just as all other administrations of the developed world have done the same, in order to bail out the banking system, in the greatest fatally flawed private-public risk transfer experiment ever attempted. Those who will walk out of it with virtually infinite wealth are about 0.1% of the US population (the same people who tell you now that all is well, and that their bonuses are fully justified). Those who won't, and will end up doing bad things to the aforementioned cohort, is everyone else. And the "everyone else" is getting angrier by the day, as they realize just how massive the wealth transfer scam truly is... if only they could tear themselves away from the iCrap, watching Tiger Woods' nonsensical Nike ads, or glower in schadenfreude as Simon Cowell rips another wanna be singer from head to toe.

Some key snippets from the BIS report:

Should we be concerned about high and sharply rising public debts? Several advanced economies have experienced higher levels of public debt than we see today. In the aftermath of World War II, for example, government debts in excess of 100% of GDP were common. And none of these led to default. In more recent times, Japan has been living with a public debt ratio of over 150% without any adverse effect on its cost. So it is possible that investors will continue to put strong faith in industrial countries’ ability to repay, and that worries about excessive public debts are exaggerated. Indeed, with only a few exceptions, during the crisis, nominal government bond yields have fallen and remained low. So far, at least, investors have continued to view government bonds as relatively safe.

But bond traders are notoriously short-sighted, assuming they can get out before the storm hits: their time horizons are days or weeks, not years or decades. We take a longer and less benign view of current developments, arguing that the aftermath of the financial crisis is poised to bring a simmering fiscal problem in industrial economies to boiling point. In the face of rapidly ageing populations, for many countries the path of pre-crisis future revenues was insufficient to finance promised expenditure.

There is no need to repeat just how horrendous the fiscal deficit picture is. Yet we will:

Overall fiscal balances have been deteriorating sharply – by 20–30 percentage points of GDP in just three years. And, unless action is taken almost immediately, there is little hope that these deficits will decline significantly in 2011. Even more worrying is the fact that most of the projected deficits are structural rather than cyclical in nature. So, in the absence of immediate corrective action, we can expect these deficits to persist even during the cyclical recovery.

Based on a very comprehensive data set, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) report that three years after a typical banking crisis the absolute level of public debt is on average about 86% higher than prior to the crisis. In those countries where the crisis was most severe, debt almost trebled. This time around, several countries are beyond this historical average: Ireland with increases in public debt of 98% between 2007 and 2009; and the United Kingdom with projected rises of 111% by 2011. Meanwhile, the United States and Spain – with projected increases of 75% and 78%, respectively, by 2011 – are not far behind.

We doubt that the current crisis will be typical in its impact on deficits and debt. The reason is that, in many countries, employment and growth are unlikely to return to their pre-crisis levels in the foreseeable future.8 As a result, unemployment and other benefits will need to be paid for several years, and high levels of public investment might also have to be maintained

Read Entire Article

Inflation Warning Etched in Steel

Bill Fleckenstein
MSN Money
April 5, 2010

Pretend it’s 1933, as so many in the deflation camp think it is or soon will be (at least from the price-of-everything standpoint). If last Wednesday you reached for a copy of that day’s Financial Times, would you have expected to see the following headline — “Steel prices set to soar: Everyday goods will cost more” — in large print above the fold?

I don’t think so.

The newspaper went on to say: “Global steel prices are set to rise by up to a third, pushing up the cost of everyday goods from cars to domestic appliances, after miners and steelmakers yesterday agreed to a ground-breaking change in the iron ore price system.”

All along, as I’ve talked about money printing, I have said it was not possible to explain in advance which goods would climb in price (or when). I just knew that as the new money was put into circulation, prices would ultimately rise. Now they have, to some degree, for various items. Steel is a great example along with other base metals, oil, health care, insurance and taxes.

Read Entire Article

Conventional Wisdom

Quotes From 1929-1930: Buy, Buy, Buy

Tyler Durden
ZeroHedge

A good friend of ours at UBS, Robert Procaccianti, periodically emails us his pithy market thoughts, and yesterday he sent us the following. Great digging into some now infamous quotes after the 1929-30 bear market and the widespread view at the time that the worst was over because, of course, Mr. Market said so … erroneously as it turned out.

“[1930 will be] a splendid employment year.” — U.S. Department of Labor, New Year’s Forecast, December 1929

“I am convinced that through these measures, we have reestablished confidence.” — Herbert Hoover, U.S. President, December 1929.

“While the crash only took place six months ago, I am convinced we have now passed through the worst — and with continued unity of effort we shall rapidly recover. There has been no significant bank or industrial failure. That danger, too, is safely behind us.” — Herbert Hoover, U.S. President, May 1930.

“This is the time to buy stocks. This is the time to recall the words of the late J. P. Morgan ... that any man who is bearish on America will go broke. Within a few days there is likely to be a bear panic rather than a bull panic. Many of the low prices as a result of this hysterical selling are not likely to be reached again in many years.” — R. W. McNeel, market analyst, as quoted in the New York Herald Tribune, October 30, 1929

“The Wall Street crash doesn't mean that there will be any general or serious business depression ... For six years American business has been diverting a substantial part of its attention, its energies and its resources on the speculative game ... Now that irrelevant, alien and hazardous adventure is over. Business has come home again, back to its job, providentially unscathed, sound in wind and limb, financially stronger than ever before.” — BusinessWeek, November 2, 1929

“...despite its severity, we believe that the slump in stock prices will prove an intermediate movement and not the precursor of a business depression such as would entail prolonged further liquidation...” — Harvard Economic Society (HES), November 2, 1929

“The end of the decline of the Stock Market will probably not be long, only a few more days at most.” — Irving Fisher, Professor of Economics at Yale University, November 14, 1929

“For the immediate future, at least, the outlook (stocks) is bright.” — Irving Fisher, Ph.D. in Economics, in early 1930

“... the outlook continues favorable...” - Harvard Economic Society Mar 29, 1930

The Costs Of Socialism

Tyler Durden
ZeroHedge

For all who doubt the Obama administration will raise tax rates into the stratosphere in the very near future, here is a chart created by dshort.com which compares the total level of debt to GDP with Federal tax brackets over the past century. The correlation between the two isunmistakable . Unless the administration promptly finds a way to reduce the massive amount of debt that it continues to issue (in March alone the US Treasury issued a massive $333 billion in net debt), tax rates will have no option but to spike to levels not seen since the 50's. And that means a tax bracket for the highest earners of about 90%... You didn't think socialism comes cheaply now did you?



Here are some additional charts that correlate major moves in the Debt-GDP ratio with key external events...Is it time for WW3 yet?

Jim Grant Presents A Prospectus For The United States, Discusses The Death Penalty For US Coinage Debasers

Tyler Durden
ZeroHedge

Jim Grant joins Morgan Stanley (and contrary to Rosenberg's expectations) in anticipating US rates to rise promptly, primarily due to the world's negative "reappraisal of the US Treasury." This is not so much a debate on inflation or deflation, as it is a call on the (un)trustworthiness of the US as a lender. To that end, Grant has put together a Treasury prospectus (which we will post as soon as we procure it) which as Jim puts it "is a compendium of the salient facts about the Treasury as if it were an issuer that did not have a printing press... All you need to know about the credit risk of the US."

The first risk factor, via the GAO, "improper payments that should not have been paid by the Treasury totalled $98.7 billion, equivalent to 5% of Treasury outlays." Keep in mind the UST raised $333 billion in net debt in March, as we pointed out yesterday. Grant also discusses the Coinage Act of 1792, whose section 19 stipulates "that the penalty for anyone who would debase the coinage of the US, is death." By that logic, a firing squad may soon need to be sequestered to Washington. Grant's concludes that there is a "great suspension of disbelief in out US monetary system on behalf of the world over. One wonders when people will say no."

The Coming Inflation Wave

By Daryl G. Jones, contributorMarch 31, 2010: 6:05 AM ET


(Fortune) -- Whether the American economy is in an inflationary or deflationary environment sounds like it should be a fundamental and settled question. But due to the unprecedented financial crisis, the answer is actually subject to intense debate among economists.

Making economic projections is far from a scientific process, so it's not surprising to find valid arguments on both sides of the divide. The economists who are right will help investors drive returns over the next three years.

Inflation can be a positive or negative, depending on the level and duration of it in our economy. The main negative associated with inflation is a drop in purchasing power of money, and therefore, consumers. In extreme cases, consumers may actually start hoarding if they fear continued and aggressive price increases. The positive side of inflation is to decrease the real value of debt, or essentially provide debt relief.

How do we measure the level and duration of inflation, to know whether it will help or hurt? In basic terms, inflation is a rise in prices of basic goods and services over a given period of time. In the United States, the government generally tracks inflation using the Consumer Price Index, or CPI.

Read Entire Article

Sell-off in US Treasuries Raises Sovereign Debt Fears

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

The yield on 10-year Treasuries – the benchmark price of global capital – surged 30 basis points in just two days last week to over 3.9pc, the highest level since the Lehman crisis. Alan Greenspan, ex-head of the US Federal Reserve, said the abrupt move may be "the canary in the coal mine", a warning to Washington that it can no longer borrow with impunity. He said there is a "huge overhang of federal debt, which we have never seen before".

David Rosenberg at Gluskin Sheff said Treasury yields have ratcheted up 90 basis points since December in a "destabilising fashion", for the wrong reasons. Growth has not been strong enough to revive fears of inflation. Commodity prices peaked in January and US home sales have fallen for the last three months, pointing to a double-dip in the housing market.

Mr Rosenberg said the yield spike recalls the move in the spring of 2007 just as the credit system started to unravel. "The question is how the equity market is going to handle this back-up in rates," he said.
The trigger for last week's sell-off was poor demand at Treasury auctions, linked to the passage of the Obama health care reform. Critics say it will add $1 trillion (£670bn) to America's debt over the next decade, a claim disputed fiercely by Democrats.

Read Entire Article

It's Official - America Now Enforces Capital Controls

Tyler Durden
ZeroHedge

It couldn't have happened to a nicer country. On March 18, with very little pomp and circumstance, president Obama passed the most recent stimulus act, the $17.5 billion Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (H.R. 2487), brilliantly goalseeked by the administration's millionaire cronies to abbreviate as HIRE. As it was merely the latest in an endless stream of acts destined to expand the government payroll to infinity, nobody cared about it, or actually read it.

Because if anyone had read it, the act would have been known as the Capital Controls Act, as one of the lesser, but infinitely more important provisions on page 27, known as Offset Provisions - Subtitle A—Foreign Account Tax Compliance, institutes just that. In brief, the Provision requires that foreign banks not only withhold 30% of all outgoing capital flows (likely remitting the collection promptly back to the US Treasury) but also disclose the full details of non-exempt account-holders to the US and the IRS. And should this provision be deemed illegal by a given foreign nation's domestic laws (think Switzerland), well the foreign financial institution is required to close the account. It's the law. If you thought you could move your capital to the non-sequestration safety of non-US financial institutions, sorry you lose - the law now says so. Capital Controls are now here and are now fully enforced by the law.

Let's parse through the just passed law, which has been mentioned by exactly zero mainstream media outlets.

Here is the default new state of capital outflows:

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting after chapter 3 the following new chapter:

‘‘CHAPTER 4—TAXES TO ENFORCE REPORTING ON CERTAIN FOREIGN ACCOUNTS
‘‘Sec. 1471. Withholdable payments to foreign financial institutions.
‘‘Sec. 1472. Withholdable payments to other foreign entities.
‘‘Sec. 1473. Definitions.
‘‘Sec. 1474. Special rules.
‘‘SEC. 1471. WITHHOLDABLE PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any withholdable payment to a foreign financial institution which does not meet the requirements of subsection (b), the withholding agent with respect to such payment shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax equal to 30 percent of the amount of such payment.

Clarifying who this law applies to:

‘‘(C) in the case of any United States account maintained by such institution, to report on an annual basis the information described in subsection (c) with respect to such account,
‘‘(D) to deduct and withhold a tax equal to 30 percent of—

‘‘(i) any passthru payment which is made by such institution to a recalcitrant account holder or another foreign financial institution which does not meet the requirements of this subsection, and

‘‘(ii) in the case of any passthru payment which is made by such institution to a foreign financial institution which has in effect an election under paragraph (3) with respect to such payment, so much of such payment as is allocable to accounts held by recalcitrant account holders or foreign financial institutions which do not meet the requirements of this subsection.

What happens if this brand new law impinges and/or is in blatant contradiction with existing foreign laws?

‘‘(F) in any case in which any foreign law would (but for a waiver described in clause (i)) prevent the reporting of any information referred to in this subsection or subsection (c) with respect to any United States account maintained by such institution—

‘‘(i) to attempt to obtain a valid and effective waiver of such law from each holder of such account, and
‘‘(ii) if a waiver described in clause (i) is not obtained from each such holder within a reasonable period of time, to close such account.

Not only are capital flows now to be overseen and controlled by the government and the IRS, but holders of foreign accounts can kiss any semblance of privacy goodbye:

‘‘(c) INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED ON UNITED STATES ACCOUNTS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The agreement described in subsection (b) shall require the foreign financial institution to report the following with respect to each United States account maintained by such institution:
‘‘(A) The name, address, and TIN of each account holder which is a specified United States person and, in the case of any account holder which is a United States owned foreign entity, the name, address, and TIN of each substantial United States owner of such entity.
‘‘(B) The account number.
‘‘(C) The account balance or value (determined at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may provide).
‘‘(D) Except to the extent provided by the Secretary, the gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the account (determined for such period and in such manner as the Secretary may provide).

Read Entire Article

Obama Pays More Than Buffett as U.S. Risks AAA Rating

March 22 (Bloomberg) -- The bond market is saying that it’s safer to lend to Warren Buffett than Barack Obama.

Two-year notes sold by the billionaire’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. in February yield 3.5 basis points less than Treasuries of similar maturity, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Procter & Gamble Co., Johnson & Johnson and Lowe’s Cos. debt also traded at lower yields in recent weeks, a situation former Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. chief fixed-income strategist Jack Malvey calls an “exceedingly rare” event in the history of the bond market.

The $2.59 trillion of Treasury Department sales since the start of 2009 have created a glut as the budget deficit swelled to a post-World War II-record 10 percent of the economy and raised concerns whether the U.S. deserves its AAA credit rating. The increased borrowing may also undermine the first-quarter rally in Treasuries as the economy improves.

“It’s a slap upside the head of the government,” said Mitchell Stapley, the chief fixed-income officer in Grand Rapids, Michigan, at Fifth Third Asset Management, which oversees $22 billion. “It could be the moment where hopefully you realize that risk is beginning to creep into your credit profile and the costs associated with that can be pretty scary.”

Moody’s Warning

While Treasuries backed by the full faith and credit of the government typically yield less than corporate debt, the relationship has flipped as Moody’s Investors Service predicts the U.S. will spend more on debt service as a percentage of revenue this year than any other top-rated country except the U.K. America will use about 7 percent of taxes for debt payments in 2010 and almost 11 percent in 2013, moving “substantially” closer to losing its AAA rating, Moody’s said last week.

“Those economies have been caught in a crisis while they are highly leveraged,” said Pierre Cailleteau, the managing director of sovereign risk at Moody’s in London. “They have to make the required adjustment to stabilize markets without choking off growth.”

Advanced economies face “acute” challenges in tackling high public debt, and unwinding existing stimulus measures will not come close to bringing deficits back to prudent levels, said John Lipsky, first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund.

Unprecedented Spending

All G7 countries, except Canada and Germany, will have debt-to-GDP ratios close to or exceeding 100 percent by 2014, Lipsky said in a speech yesterday at the China Development Forum in Beijing. Already this year, the average ratio in advanced economies is expected to reach the levels seen in 1950, after World War II, he said.

Obama’s unprecedented spending and the Federal Reserve’s emergency measures to fix the financial system are boosting the economy and cutting the risk of corporate failures. Standard & Poor’s said the default rate will drop to 5 percent by year-end from 10.4 percent in February.

Bonds sold by companies have returned 3.24 percent this year, including reinvested interest, compared with a 1.55 percent gain for Treasuries, Bank of America Merrill Lynch index data show. Returns exceeded government debt by a record 23 percentage points in 2009.

By: Daniel Kruger and Bryan Keogh

Read Entire Article

Kiss AAA Goodbye - Moodys

March 15 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. and the U.K. have moved “substantially” closer to losing their AAA credit ratings as the cost of servicing their debt rose, according to Moody’s Investors Service.

The governments of the two economies must balance bringing down their debt burdens without damaging growth by removing fiscal stimulus too quickly, Pierre Cailleteau, managing director of sovereign risk at Moody’s in London, said in a telephone interview.

Under the ratings company’s so-called baseline scenario, the U.S. will spend more on debt service as a percentage of revenue this year than any other top-rated country except the U.K., and will be the biggest spender from 2011 to 2013, Moody’s said today in a report.

“We expect the situation to further deteriorate in terms of the key ratings metrics before they start stabilizing,” Cailleteau said. “This story is not going to stop at the end of the year. There is inertia in the deterioration of credit metrics.”

The pound fell against the dollar and the euro for the first time in three days, depreciating 0.8 percent to $1.5090, while the dollar index snapped a four-day drop, adding 0.3 percent to 90.075.

The U.S. government will spend about 7 percent of its revenue servicing debt in 2010 and almost 11 percent in 2013, according to the baseline scenario of moderate economic recovery, fiscal adjustments in line with government plans and a gradual increase in interest rates, Moody’s said.

Under its adverse scenario, which assumes 0.5 percent lower growth each year, less fiscal adjustment and a stronger interest-rate shock, the U.S. will be paying about 15 percent of revenue in interest payments, more than the 14 percent limit that would lead to a downgrade to AA, Moody’s said.

Read Entire Article

You Are Being Scammed. Repeat: You Are Being Scammed

(ZeroHedge.com) Presenting a detailed look at "Repo 105" - the next soundbite sure to fill the airwaves over the next weeks and months, as more and more banks are uncovered to be using this borderline criminal accounting gimmick to make their leverage ratios look better. This is the first time we have heard this loophole abuse by a bank, be it defunct (Lehman) or existing (everyone else).

There should be an immediate investigation into how many other banks are currently taking advantage of this artificial scheme to manipulate and misrepresent their cap ratio, and just why the New York Fed can claim it had no idea of this very critical component of the Shadow Economy.

From the report:

"Lehman employed off-balance sheet devices, known within Lehman as “Repo 105” and “Repo 108” transactions, to temporarily remove securities inventory from its balance sheet, usually for a period of seven to ten days, and to create a materially misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008. Repo 105 transactions were nearly identical to standard repurchase and resale (“repo”) transactions that Lehman (and other investment banks) used to secure short-term financing, with a critical difference: Lehman accounted for Repo 105 transactions as “sales” as opposed to financing transactions based upon the overcollateralization or higher than normal haircut in a Repo 105 transaction. By recharacterizing the Repo 105 transaction as a “sale,” Lehman removed the inventory from its balance sheet."

"Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet. Lehman’s periodic reports did not disclose the cash borrowing from the Repo 105 transaction – i.e., although Lehman had in effect borrowed tens of billions of dollars in these transactions, Lehman did not disclose the known obligation to repay the debt. Lehman used the cash from the Repo 105 transaction to pay down other liabilities, thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total assets reported on its balance sheet and lowering its leverage ratios. Thus, Lehman’s Repo 105 practice consisted of a two-step process: (1) undertaking Repo 105 transactions followed by (2) the use of Repo 105 cash borrowings to pay down liabilities, thereby reducing leverage. A few days after the new quarter began, Lehman would borrow the necessary funds to repay the cash borrowing plus interest, repurchase the securities, and restore the assets to its balance sheet."

Lehman never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 transactions, its accounting treatment for these transactions, the considerable escalation of its total Repo 105 usage in late 2007 and into 2008, or the material impact these transactions had on the firm’s publicly reported net leverage ratio. According to former Global Financial Controller Martin Kelly, a careful review of Lehman’s Forms 10?K and 10?Q would not reveal Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. Lehman failed to disclose its Repo 105 practice even though Kelly believed “that the only purpose or motive for the transactions was reduction in balance sheet;” felt that “there was no substance to the transactions;” and expressed concerns with Lehman’s Repo 105 program to two consecutive Lehman Chief Financial Officers – Erin Callan and Ian Lowitt – advising them that the lack of economic substance to Repo 105 transactions meant “reputational risk” to Lehman if the firm’s use of the transactions became known to the public. In addition to its material omissions, Lehman affirmatively misrepresented in its financial statements that the firm treated all repo transactions as financing transactions – i.e., not sales – for financial reporting purposes.

And here is the Fed punchline, as it once again implicates Tim Geithner:

"From 2003 to 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner served as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”). The Examiner described to Secretary Geithner how Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to remove approximately $50 billion of liquid assets from the balance sheet at quarter-end in 2008 and explained that this practice reduced Lehman’s net leverage. Secretary Geithner “did not recall being aware of” Lehman’s Repo 105 program, but stated: “If this had been a bank we were supervising, that [i.e., Lehman’s Repo 105 program] would have been a huge issue for the New York Fed.”

And even though the Fed should have been fully aware of any shadow transaction be they "matched book" repos or the "105 variety, nobody had any clue. Just who the hell was regulating banks???

Jan Voigts, who was an Examining Officer in FRBNY’s Bank Supervision Department, had no knowledge of Lehman removing assets from its balance sheet at or near quarter-end via a repo trade treated as a true sale under a United Kingdom opinion letter.

Arthur Angulo, who was a Senior Vice President in FRBNY’s Bank Supervision department, likewise was unaware that Lehman engaged in repo transactions at quarter-end, under a United Kingdom true sale opinion letter, where the assets would be returned to Lehman’s balance sheet following the end of the reporting period. Angulo said that the described repo transactions appeared to go “beyond other types of [permissible] balance sheet management." Angulo also said that he would have wanted to know about off-market transactions where Lehman accepted a higher haircutthan a repo seller normally would accept for a certain type of collateral.

Thomas Baxter, FRBNY General Counsel, had no knowledge of Repo 105 transactions, either by name or design. Baxter was generally aware of firms using quarter-end and month-end “balance sheet window-dressing,” but did not recall this being an issue linked to Lehman specifically.

Stunningly, nobody at the SEC was aware of Lehman's Repo 105 program. And guess what: NEITHER DID DICK FULD. This is unbelievable - the criminality reaches to the very top, yet the very top denies all knowledge.

"Richard Fuld, Lehman’s former Chief Executive Officer denied any recollection of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. Fuld said he had no knowledge that Lehman treated any kind of repo transaction as a true sale or that Lehman ever removed from its balance sheet assets transferred in a repo transaction. In addition, Fuld did not recall having seen any reports referencing the amount of the firm’s Repo 105 activity. Fuld further stated that he did not know that Lehman removed approximately $49 and $50 billion in inventory off its balance sheet at quarter-end through the use of Repo 105 transactions in first quarter 2008 and second quarter 2008, respectively. Fuld said, however, that if he had learned that Lehman was temporarily cleansing its balance sheet of assets at quarter-end through Repo 105 transactions, it would have concerned him."

Evidence, however, suggests that Fuld is blatantly lying:

"Fuld’s denial of recollection must be weighed by a trier of fact against other evidence. Fuld recalled having many conversations with his executives about reducing net leverage and emphasized to the Examiner how important it was for Lehman to reduce its net leverage. The night before the March 28, 2008 Executive Committee meeting, Fuld received materials for the meeting, including an agenda of topics including “Repo 105/108” and “Delever v Derisk” and a presentation that referenced Lehman’s quarter-end Repo 105 usage for first quarter 2008 – $49.1 billion. The materials also were forwarded by Fuld’s assistant to other Lehman executives. It appears that Fuld did not attend the March 28 meeting, but Bart McDade recalled having specific discussions with Fuld about Lehman’s Repo 105 usage in June 2008. Sometime that month, McDade spoke to Fuld about reducing Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. McDade walked Fuld through the Balance Sheet and Key Disclosures document (reproduced in part below) and discussed with Fuld Lehman’s quarter-end Repo 105 usage – $38.6 billion at year-end 2007; $49.1 billion at first quarter 2008; and $50.3 billion at second quarter 2008."

Read More

Budget Deficit Sets Record in February

By MARTIN CRUTSINGER (AP)

WASHINGTON — The government ran up the largest monthly deficit in history in February, keeping the flood of red ink on track to top last year's record for the full year.

The Treasury Department said Wednesday that the February deficit totaled $220.9 billion, 14 percent higher than the previous record set in February of last year.

The deficit through the first five months of this budget year totals $651.6 billion, 10.5 percent higher than a year ago.

The Obama administration is projecting that the deficit for the 2010 budget year will hit an all-time high of $1.56 trillion, surpassing last year's $1.4 trillion total. The administration is forecasting that the deficit will remain above $1 trillion in 2011, giving the country thrree straight years of $1 trillion-plus deficits.

The administration says the huge deficits are necessary to get the country out of the deepest recession since the 1930s. But Republicans have attacked the stimulus spending as wasteful and a failure at the primary objective of lowering unemployment.

Read Entire Article

Houston, We Have A Problem

As Budget Deficit Hits Record High, Interest On US Public Debt Hits Record Low

(ZeroHedge.com)- What is wrong with this picture: the MTS just announced that the February budget deficit was $220.9 billion, after receipts of just $107.5 billion with vastly surpassed by outlays of $328.4 billion. This is a record.

Yet the interest on the public debt was a mere $16.9 billion (page 13 of the MTS report). The reason for this is because as TreasuryDirect points out, in February the interest on public marketable debt (actual cash outlays), which as of Monday stood at $8.061 trillion, hit an all time low of 2.548%.

How is it possible that unprecedented debt accumulation can result in ever declining interest rates, and Treasury auctions, such as today's 10 Year reopening, in which the Bid To Cover hit an all time high? One answer: The Federal Reserve, which through complete domination of the entire capital market courtesy of ZIRP and QE has now turned market logic upside down by 180 degrees.

In a normal world, the more money you borrow, the greater the associated risk, and the greater the interest payments on this debt. Not in America though. So can we assume that the Fed can forever keep rates on debt at record low levels? No. Which begs the question: what happens when interest rates do finally start going up?

Read Entire Article

Moody's Warns Of Pain Ahead For Financials; Profitability Concerns Due To Record Charge-Offs

(ZeroHedge.com)- A new report by Moody's "U.S. Bank Asset Quality: Negative Trends Slow Down, But The Pain Isn't Over" has some gloomy observations about the asset quality of the US financial system, and its implications for future charge offs and overall profitability.

In estimating total loan charge-offs between 2008 and 2011 Moody's predicts that of the total $536 billion (really $633 billion if unadjusted for purchasing accounting marks), which is equal to 9.7% of all loan outstanding at December 31, 2007, only $240 billion has been charged off, leaving $296 billion still to hit the books. Yet banks have taken loan loss allowances of "only" $188 billion, leaving just over $100 billion unaccounted for. And people wonder why banks are unwilling to lend.

Moody's conclusion on what happens as reality catches up with charge offs: "Although banks have provisioned for a substantial amount of their remaining charge-offs, the additional provision required will extend the period that many banks will be unprofitable well into 2010, and will reduce capital levels." Obviously, Moody's estimates do not go past 2011 when many anticipate the next major wave of loan impairments to occur in the form of Option ARM resets and Commercial Real Estate maturities.

Furthermore, Moody's does not account for securitized credit card losses, which will also be an area of major pain for the banks in the upcoming years. Just how big the impact of all these will be is still to be determined although it is very likely that the overall impact will impair overall bank capital by well over $100 billion over the next several years.

Read More

Failed Banks May Get Pension-Fund Backing as FDIC Seeks Cash

Dakin Campbell
Bloomberg
March 9, 2010

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is trying to encourage public retirement funds that control more than $2 trillion to buy all or part of failed lenders, taking a more direct role in propping up the banking system, said people briefed on the matter.

Direct investments may allow funds such as those in Oregon, New Jersey and California to cut fees for private-equity managers, and the agency to get better prices for distressed assets, the people said. They declined to be identified because talks with regulators are confidential.

Oregon’s retirement fund may contribute $100 million as regulators seek “the support of state pension funds to solve the crisis surrounding ongoing bank failures,” Jay Fewel, a senior investment officer at the Oregon State Treasury, said in a presentation at the fund’s Feb. 24 meeting. New Jersey’s fund may also participate, said Orin Kramer, chairman of New Jersey’s State Investment Council.

Read entire article

China Signals That It May Allow Currency to Rise Against Dollar

(CNBC) China sent its clearest signal yet that it was ready to allow yuan appreciation after an 18-month hiatus, saying on Wednesday it would consider major currencies, not just the dollar, in guiding the exchange rate.

In its third-quarter monetary policy report, the People's Bank of China departed from well-worn language on keeping the yuan "basically stable at a reasonable and balanced level." It hinted instead at a shift from an effective dollar peg that has been in place since the middle of last year.

"Following the principles of initiative, controllability and gradualism, with reference to international capital flows and changes in major currencies, we will improve the yuan exchange-rate formation mechanism," the central bank said in a 46-page monetary policy report.

The comments, published just days before a visit to Shanghai and Beijing by U.S. President Barack Obama, set out the possibility of a return to exchange rate appreciation that began with a landmark July 2005 revaluation.

The yuan strengthened by nearly 20 percent against the dollar until concern over the impact of the global financial crisis prompted Beijing to hit the brakes in the middle of last year to protect exporters.

The yuan has been stuck at around 6.83 per dollar ever since, drawing increasing ire from other countries, especially as it has followed the dollar downwards against other currencies.

The dollar has dropped 13 percent against a basket of major currencies including the yen and euro since mid-February.

Back to a Basket?

Some analysts have called for the return to a genuine basket of currencies, which the central bank said in 2005 it would use as a reference for the yuan.

Winterizing Your Portfolio - A CNBC Special Report

"I think the wording change ... shows that it is an irresistible trend for China to resume yuan appreciation," said Xing Ziqiang, an economist at China International Capital Corp (CICC) in Beijing.

"It is not sustainable for the yuan to always be pegged to the U.S. dollar; after all, the repegging since late 2008 was just part of China's measures to address the global financial crisis, and now the impact of the financial crisis is fading, so the yuan should resume appreciation sooner or later."

The central bank's report came just hours after data that showed the world's third-largest economy had firmly put the worst of the global financial crisis behind it. Factory output growth surged to a 19-month high of 16.2 percent in October.

While exports were still down in year-on-year terms, economists pointed to the likelihood that they would start growing again soon.

Some analysts said the statement could have been timed to send a signal ahead of Obama's Nov. 15-18 visit to China.

Obama told Reuters on Monday that he planned to raise the currency issue during his trip.

However, Beijing is increasingly facing complaints about its currency from other emerging economies, which see an undervalued yuan as undercutting them in global markets.

Read Entire Article

Central Bankers' Fears As They Watch The Plummeting Dollar

(ZeroHedge) Barclays, whose primary goal these days seems to be to enjoin the Fed in ruining the dollar (talk to a gummy bear salesman from Barclays and you will get a "short the dollar" pitch), presumably in order to make even more money on their alleged huge short dollar prop exposure, is out with a new note from currency strategist Steven Englander. His latest perspective is that all of today's conventional wisdom interpretations of IMF data demonstrating a diversification away from the dollar in global reserves is in fact not what it seems. If it were, the dollar would be at most worth zero, and at worst, the Fed would be paying you to take every new batch of brand new Obama-faced $1 trillion bills from its basement.

To wit:

IMF data show a drop in the USD’s share of reserves from a peak of 73% to just below 63% in Q2 09. Most of this is due to valuation effects, rather than any transactions by central banks. Its share has declined because the USD is not worth as much, not because central banks have been able to substitute other currencies for USD. Insofar as there is evidence of a change in central bank behavior, it is very recent (see Central banks walk the ‘not buying USD’ walk, 5 October 2009). If it were not for the changes in the USD’s value, its current share in reserve portfolios would be less than 1pp below the 10-year average and about 2.5pp below the peak.

The IMF COFER line shows a steady decline in the USD’s share in reserve portfolios based on its published headline numbers. These are the numbers most often discussed by journalists and investors (Figure 1). We also calculate what the USD’s share would have been if exchange rates had been stable during 1999-09. This would provide an estimate of how much USD has been actually bought or sold relative to other currencies, and eliminates valuation effects because exchange rates are held fixed. The values of the currency used are arbitrary and change only the level of the share, not its trend. We recalculate the USD’s share using exchange rates at: 1) Q2 01, when the USD’s share in the headline IMF data was at its peak; and 2) Q2 09, when its share hit its trough. Our calculations exclude the small “other currencies” category because there is no way to fix an exchange rate for this category. This omission has almost no effect on the outcomes.

And here is the punchline: basically the only reason reserve portfolios have seen a decline in the dollar is due to the ceaseless pounding the dollar receives only because it is cursed with being the currency of choice of the current batch of madmen in the Federal Lunatic Asylum Reserve.

If the value of the USD had not changed, its share in reserve portfolios would be virtually trendless. It does not matter whether exchange rates are from a strong or weak dollar period. As noted above, whatever FX rate is used, the Q2 level would be less than 1pp below the 10-year average.

In valuation-adjusted terms, the USD’s share hit a local peak at the end of 2004, illustrating that in the past, central banks have been content to buy and largely hold the USD when it was depreciating. When it really came under downward pressure in 2004, its incremental share in reserves rose to almost 80% (Figure 2; the incremental share is the USD’s share in valuation-adjusted reserves accumulation over the prior eight quarters). A similar surge in the USD’s share occurred as it weakened into 2008. By contrast, the 2005 strength led to a much lower USD share in incremental reserves.

Read Entire Article